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Introduction
Fresh water is a scarce and increasingly costly resource, particularly in drier continents.
Thus, the question of how to best allocate fresh water resources is becoming ever more important. According to the economics literature, the answer to this question is obvious: use markets and efficient pricing. Unfortunately for the authors of this literature, water managers seem reluctant to agree, particularly on the question of allocation during drought.
In times of relative water scarcity (i.e. drought), urban water managers typically employ a combination of price increases, mandatory restrictions (usually on outdoor uses), and campaigns aimed at inducing voluntary conservation measures -including awareness raising. Reflecting the predilection of economists, the impacts of prices on water demand have been extensively studied.
1 Mandatory restrictions have also received ample attention, generally with the conclusion that they are effective but inefficient tools for demand management. In contrast, campaigns to stimulate voluntary conservation have been the subject of relatively few econometric studies, and most authors conclude they are ineffective approaches to demand management.
2
The contrast between the almost universal use by water managers of information campaigns aimed at eliciting voluntary conservation, and the lack of econometric evidence that they are successful, suggests two possibilities: either water managers are misguided, or the econometric studies are missing something. Citing a large body of survey literature which suggests substantial impacts of voluntary conservation campaigns (of the order of 25%), Syme et al. (2000) argue in favour of the latter conclusion.
The current paper takes a novel approach to identifying voluntary demand restraint. We estimate the demand response to changing water storage (i.e. dam) levels, controlling for all observable policy changes. Informing consumers of the storage levels was central to the education campaign undertaken by the utility provider in our case study of the Australian Capital Territory. Thus, while we are not estimating the impact of the information campaign per se, we certainly expect that is contributed to the response we observe.
Including water storage levels in demand specifications also has important implications for the assessment of the efficacy and efficiency of other demand management tools. The introduction of demand management policies is endogenous, and almost invariably driven by low water levels in storage reservoirs. Thus, if there is a non-negligible voluntary response to dam levels, then omitting them from a demand specification will bias estimates of the efficacy and efficiency of other policy changes. For example, omitting voluntary response to dam level may lead to an over-estimate of the demand response to mandatory outdoor use restrictions. This, in turn, will lead to an overestimate of the welfare costs of mandatory restrictions.
3
The relative lack of attention paid by the economics literature to the impact of voluntary water conservation measures in urban areas is likely due to a combination of the difficulty of quantifying relevant policies (Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf, 1999; Syme et al., 2000; Halich & Stephenson, 2009) , and the skepticism that neoclassical economics imbues for the likelihood of their success. Water in storages is a perfect example of common pool resource and -as classically espoused by Hardin (1968) -the neoclassical result is that no single resource user has incentive to conserve the resource since what she leaves will simply be consumed by her greedy competitors.
Since Hardin's dismal prediction, a substantial body of field and laboratory evidence has been amassed which indicates voluntary contribution of to public goods is common (Ostrom et al., 1999) . The extent of co-operative versus free-rider behavior is, however, known to be highly context specific. This leaves us with an open empirical question.
The next section surveys the existing empirical literature on the effect of information campaigns for water demand management. Section 3 introduces our case study and data and section 4 explains our empirical approach. Section 5 presents results and section 6 concludes.
Information Campaigns, Storage Levels, and Water Conservation
The current paper contributes to the literature on voluntary conservation measures by residential consumers can make to demand management, particularly in times of drought.
Water managers have used a wide variety of tools to encourage voluntary conservation, including subsidies (often in the form of rebates) for adoption of water efficient technologies, changing billing frequency and presentation of consumption information therein, home audits, campaigns to educate consumers on ways to conserve water, and information or awareness raising campaigns emphasizing the need to conserve water.
Usually a number of these approaches are combined, which complicates attempts to identify the effect of individual components on demand. The intensity of a campaign is also often difficult to quantify (Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf, 1999; Syme et al., 2000; Halich & Stephenson, 2009) . As a result, most econometric studies simply include dummy or categorical variables to indicate the presence of a voluntary campaign of some sort (Halich & Stephenson, 2009 ).
The focus of our empirical analysis is on dam storage levels and -to a lesser extentaggregate water consumption targets. Both targets and storage levels had been widely publicized in our case study period, appearing weekly in television and print news for at least two years prior to the start of our sample. 4 Thus our paper differs from other studies in that it focuses primarily on changes in the information consumers receive, rather than changes in the intensity of the information campaign.
There are several mechanisms through which we expect dam storage level to affect the conservation behavior of informed consumers. Storage levels are a direct measure of the severity of the water shortage and therefore the potential costs of maintaining current levels of consumption. 5 Thus lower storage levels may make consumers more likely to adopt purely voluntary conservation measures, adhere to mandatory (but not easily enforceable)
outdoor use restrictions, 6 or report restriction violators to authorities.
There are two relevant (but small) literatures on voluntary water conservation. Firstly, a few papers examine factors such as reported attitudes, beliefs and intention to make behavioral changes to conserve water. Kantola, Syme and Nesdale (1983) found that participants who 4 In the latter half of our sample the information campaign was intensified and electronic signs displaying daily dam level, target consumption and actual consumption were placed on five major roads. We control for this in our regressions. 5 Consumers may view dam levels as an indicator of how soon water capture and storage expansion projects will be undertaken, with their implied financial and environmental costs. They may also view low dam levels as indicating the probability that the water may actually "run out", requiring the costly import of water. 6 Outdoor use restrictions of varying severity were in place throughout our sample period. We include them in our empirical analysis.
watched films about Perth (their city's) water supply situation reported significantly higher intentions to conserve water compared to a control group, and that feelings of citizens duty to conserve water and concern about the water situation are closely related to behavioral intentions. Aitken et al. (1994) combined survey and informational treatment with actual water consumption observations for a sample of Melbourne households. They found that while attitudes, habits and values were very poor predictors of consumption, feedback on consumption levels relative to an appropriate mean significantly reduced consumption in the sample period.
Of particular relevance to the current paper, Yardley (2009) Other more recent studies not discussed by Syme et al. (2000) are unlikely to have changed their conclusion. They mostly suffer from the same shortcomings and, at best, find reductions of the order of 5-10% of mean consumption. 7 A notable exception is the paper identifying variation through the use of daily rather than monthly or quarterly data, and secondly because dam levels vary in considerably more complex ways than policy variables.
Case Study and Data
We use daily water usage data 8 from the Australian National Capital region 9 from December 2005 to March 2010. The data was provided by ActewAGL 10 which also provided daily dam level measurement, water usage targets, water restriction level and water price data. The use of daily data has two advantages compared to the monthly data used in previous studies of non-price demand management measures. Firstly, it significantly reduces the extent of colinearity of the multiple policy changes that were made, an issue which has plagued most studies (Syme et al. 2000) . Secondly it allows for the inclusion of detailed weather controls. For a typical Australian household sample it will be very important to control for local weather conditions which will explain a large part of the consumption variation in overall water usage. 11 Outside water usage plays a big role detached and semidetached dwellings which use on average 130% more water than flats (Troy 2004). In the 8 There are typically two other types of water consumption data available: monthly postcode or suburb data and quarterly household level data. There is a tradeoff between disaggregation and frequency in the choice of usage data. This is due to the nature of the data collection where meters are commonly read off every 3 months for an individual household. In this tradeoff we chose the higher aggregation to get the highest frequency data. Although we would like to be able to control for -or interact variables of interest withhousehold or suburb level characteristics we find that it is foremost important to control for weather as detailed as possible. Choosing more disaggregated and still controlling for weather in a detailed way would use too many degrees of freedom and not be feasible with the existing short data sets. 9 This in mainly Canberra and its suburbs but includes Queanbeyan just over the state boarder in New South Wales. 10 ActewAGL is a utility joint venture formed in 2000 by the private Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) and the government owned water and electricity company (Actew). ActewAGL is the sole provider of freshwater and wastewater services in the ACT region. (for more details and history see http://www.actew.com.au or http://www.actewagl.com.au) 11 We use a large number of weather variables in our final specification. All of these are highly significant and together explain 41% of the water usage variation in the data.
Australian Capital Territory over 90% of households live in detached and semi-detached dwellings 12 within these outdoor water use accounts for 43% of their water consumption.
13
The weather data is from the Bureau of Meteorology's Canberra airport weather station.
14
The observations include daily weather variables such as sun-hours, precipitation, temperature, evaporation and many more. 15 We also obtained quarterly estimates of population for the region from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
16
All collected variables are combined to a daily time series of 1554 observations. In Figure 1 we plot the data series over the observation period. The red line shows the evolution of the dam levels from the start of our series with 68% to its low point of 30% The yellow line in Figure 1 shows the introduction of water restriction levels. We observe five restriction levels in our sample. Stage 1 which we observe from the start of our sample incorporates relatively minor water restrictions. What Figure 2 also shows is that policy levers were not moved simultaneously. In particularly, price changes were not coincident with restriction changes. This will allow us some confidence in separately identifying the impacts of the different policy types. 
Empirical Methodology
We first check our water usage and dam level data series for their time series properties. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null, confirming the stationary of these series. The Durbin-Watson test statistic is 1 indicating the existence of series correlation in the residuals. As a robust test for autocorrelation we use a Breusch-Godfrey test and strongly reject the null hypotheses of no serial correlation for first and higher orders. We also test for heteroskedasticity using the White 's general test and Breusch-Pagan test. Both tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
Given the above test results we employ the Newey-West estimation of our covariance matrix to deal with the serial correlation and the heterogeneity in the data and to get To have a direct look if the announced target changes have any effect on water consumption we can conduct an event study. These are well known from the finance literature. 21 Looking at a narrow time period around the announced target changes all other effect from policy change or seasonal weather effect can be assumed to not change. Any unexplained variation in consumption that changes systematically before and after the target change can then be contributed to people reaction to the announced target levels.
In classical example from the finance literature the event is an announcement. The announcement can be of positive or negative nature about a listed stock. The event study methodology compares the abnormal return of the stock the days before the announcement to the days after the announcement.
In our case the change in target level is the news or the event. We will look at the unexplained variation in water consumption controlling for weather data and any other changing variables. We can then look at the difference in `abnormal' water consumptionthe error term of our regression -in the weeks before and after the announcement.
We look at the differences graphically and run tests to see if the average `abnormal' water consumption is different before and after the target change. We perform individual t-test for each event window to see if the difference is significant. We also run a combined test over all events to look at the cumulative `abnormal' water consumption across all target changes. The event study graph in Figures 3 will give an intuitive view of the methodology described above. For more details see also Laplante, Dasgupta and Mamingi (1998) . In the next section we will first present our main regression results and robustness checks before we turn to the event study results later on.
Results
The main results of the paper are presented in Table 2 . The first column in table 2 represents the correlation of (lagged) dam level with consumption, controlling for all weather and other exogenous controls, but no policy variables. The coefficient of 0.011
suggests that the combined policy-induced and voluntary response to a 10% decrease in dam level would result in a demand decrease of around 11%. Moving across the columns we progressively add policy controls. As we expect the coefficient on dam level decreases, but even with a comprehensive set of policy controls remains statistically and economically significant. We interpret the coefficient in column 5 as indicating that a 10% decrease in dam level will induce voluntary conservation reductions of 4.5%. (Newey-West) . (ln) indicates a variable that enters in logarithmic specification. ML stands from mega litres. Each regression contains month and day of the week dummies and the complete set of weather controls described in Section 4.
The coefficients on price also decrease as expected when we control for additional policy variables, though the estimates in all columns lie comfortably within the range reported in the literature. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) find a mean of -.41 and a median of -.35 in a metasample of 314 price elasticities from 64 studies. Our preferred specification for price is column 3 since signs are insignificant and targets are close to collinear with price changes once month dummies are included. In this specification the elasticity estimate for the lowuser and average-user marginal costs are around -.27 and -.20 respectively. To compare these figures to the literature (which generally has disaggregated data and therefore a single relevant marginal costs) we need to add the coefficients together.
22 Thus our equivalent total price elasticity estimate is -.47. This lies between recently estimated Australian short-run marginal price elasticities of -.35 by Grafton & Kompas (2007) for Sydney and the -.51 estimated by Hoffmann et al. (2006) for Brisbane.
The estimated effect of increasingly strict mandatory restrictions on outdoor uses was relatively small at a maximum of 12%. It is difficult to place these relative to the literature since a dummy variable is generally included for "any restriction" (Kenney et al., 2004; Renwick & Green, 2000; Grafton & Ward, 2010) . However, according Ward (pers. comms.), Grafton & Ward (2010) found no significant difference on consumption when they controlled for individual levels of restriction. 22 The intuition of adding the two elasticity estimates can be obtained from the thought experiment of calculating the effect of an uniform price increase which increased both marginal costs by, say, 10%.
In columns 4 and 5 we find a small negative effect of the introduction of roadside dam and target information signs, much as we would expect. The effect is, however, statistically insignificant. Finally in column 5, the coefficient on the consumption target is highly economically and statistically significant. This is no surprise as the target is set jointly by state government and the water utility and therefore acts as a proxy for the level of demand management effort exerted by both organizations. Target captures other aspects of policy not captured by the variables in the first 4 columns, notably policies aimed at nonresidential users. Table 3 shows the robustness of the coefficients from our preferred specification -column 3
of Table 2 . Firstly in column 2 we drop the dam level from the regression and see that a number of our estimates change substantially. In particular the price elasticity on the marginal cost for the average consumer almost halves, leaving it less than half the elasticity estimated for the marginal cost faced by the low-end users. Meanwhile the impact of stage 1 restrictions (compared to stage 3) becomes large and significant and the summer exemption becomes significant with the wrong sign. (Newey-West) . (ln) indicates a variable that enters in logarithmic specification. ML stands from mega litres. Each regression contains month and day of the week dummies and the complete set of weather controls described in Section 4.
Columns 3 tests robustness to the inclusion of a time trend. The time trend is statistically insignificant and there is negligible change in any of the coefficients except for an increase in price elasticity. Column 4 adds a lagged dependent variable directly addressing the observed serial correlation evident in the errors. Though the coefficients change, the implied long-run effects of all our coefficients of interest are very stable. 23 Finally column 5 restricts the sample to the stage 3 restriction period, thereby excluding the initial rapid decrease in both dam level and consumption at the start of our sample. Once again the coefficients are robust.
The economic literature on demand management has paid significant attention to the estimation of price elasticities. Both average cost and marginal cost have been argued to be appropriate price variables. Additionally, since we are using aggregate data, arguments could be made for the use of either average marginal cost or marginal cost faced by the average user. Table 4 shows that although the estimated price elasticities themselves vary substantially, the coefficient on dam level is robust. Interestingly, and somewhat reassuringly, the average price elasticity of -0.50 is close to the implied total price elasticity of -0.47 from our base regression. (Newey-West) . (ln) indicates a variable that enters in logarithmic specification. ML stands from mega litres. Each regression contains month and day of the week dummies and the complete set of weather controls described in Section 4. Now we turn the results of our event study design. Figure 3 presents an event study result for a downward shift in the target from 139 ML to 112 ML as it took place from summer to autumn 2007. The graphs shows the unexplained variation in water usage after we control for weather and other month and day effects and any other variables that change during the event window. The blue line is the daily error term of our main specification column 3 in Table 2 . We observe them here for an event window of three weeks before and after target change. The green and red lines present the means of the 3 week before and after period.
And the yellow line shows the direction of the target change. The horizontal line marks the target change event. Inferring from this graphical representation we might conclude that there is an effect of the target change on consumption. When tested the small reduction is not significant. Such a graph and test are run for each target change in our sample during the consistent stage 3 restriction scheme. We include all event window graphs in the Appendix. The test statistics for all events are summarized in Table 3 . The null hypothesis of the abnormal water consumption being equal before and after the target shift cannot be rejected for any of the individual target shifts. The joined test across all events using robust standard errors can also not be rejected. With a p-value of .706 we find that the cumulative `abnormal' water consumption differences around the target changes are not significantly different from zero. We were also unable to reject the null of no significant difference when the event window was shortened to one or two weeks either side of the target change. Thus we conclude that changes in target levels did not have an appreciable direct effect on people's water consumption. 
Conclusion
Information campaigns are almost universally used by water managers in times of short supply and survey evidence suggests that they are effective at changing conservation behaviour. The econometric literature to date, however, has been unable to identify substantial demand reductions following these campaigns.
We use a novel approach to identifying voluntary behavior through demand response to changes in dam level for a population which was exposed to a long-term awareness campaign which emphasized community responsibility for dam-levels. We find dam level is significantly and robustly correlated with consumption. The magnitude of the effect is such that the dam level change from 60% to 30% in our sample is estimated to have resulted in demand reduction of around 15%.
We view our results as evidence that, among a well-informed population, voluntary conservation can make a substantial contribution to demand reductions precisely when the need for them is greatest. While our findings by no means prove the efficiency of information campaigns as a demand management tool, we do think they call into question the conclusion from the bulk of the econometric studies that information campaigns are ineffective. Further research on the efficacy of information campaigns seems warranted, particularly on the interaction between education, price, and mandatory restrictions. In light of the ongoing push for a greater reliance on price as a means of allocating scarce urban water supplies, 24 it also seems pertinent to ask whether this " 
